‘No Outlaws in the Gender Galaxy’: A Trans- feminist review/discussion

Introduction: 

A couple of weeks after having read No Outlaws in the Gender Galaxy, I found myself halting before I used the term ‘transgender’ to refer to self. I was speaking to a feminist, cis-woman friend. We were talking about possible college applications, colleges that may have added the column for ‘transgender’. Even in a safe space with a friend, it took me a moment to realize that I could use this word again and again and again, to define myself. The irony was not lost on me as I skipped back to the Introduction of the book under review that quoted a UGC notification (pursuant to the NALSA judgment) stating the inclusion of ‘transgender’ under various scholarships and fellowships offered by the State. In that moment it struck me: that quote (p. x) was perhaps the only place in the book where the term ‘transgender’ is used as a legitimate political category; a quote that can be attributed not to the authors, but to the State.

Before I explain my disagreements with the book it is essential for me to clarify that I have in passing been associated with, thought of possible political collaborations with and eventually disagreed with the politics of the space (LABIA – A Queer Feminist LBT Collective, active in Bombay) that the authors occupy. At one level, despite the disagreements, there was a forced sense of solidarity that one wished to hold on to. It is with that sense that one approached the book, only to be more thoroughly disappointed, even aghast, at the complete erasure of the histories of trans identities, trans-resistances, the vague, diluted misrepresentations of trans-politics, and a superficial, hackneyed ‘theory’ of gender, put forward by the authors.

In the time that has elapsed between the publication of the book and now (two years) much has changed in the space of ‘larger movements’, shifting perspectives towards critique and solidarities. Now, too many say, is the time to put aside your ‘petty’ differences. Everyday there is a new call somewhere to unite for some larger cause (often followed with an almost threatening ‘or else’!). So today, when I write this, I do write with a good amount of fear; the fear of being called ‘divisive’, one who couldn’t fight ‘the real fight’; the fear of one’s words being used to sabotage ‘solidarities’ and ‘movements’ and what not. Of course one’s own insignificance in the political canvas allows one to laugh this off on most days. On other days, the fear of being outlawed from known political spaces, being dropped off mid political flight, further away from erstwhile accepting spaces of political discussion can be acute. On most days, one realizes that this dropping off has already happened because of prolonged inability to ‘articulate effectively’ one’s disagreements. So the dreams are often of starting from scratch and what not, or simply disappearing.

“Fear. I was scared to walk on the road for fear of people recognizing me. I was worried someone might mock me while I walked on the road. I was afraid the police might arrest me. I held back from taking the bus because I wasn’t sure who I could sit next to. I was scared to use the public toilet for fear that people might know I was different. I was scared that rotten tomatoes might be thrown at me in the market. I was scared of falling in love for fear of being punished hard. Fear of everything and anything. Why am I so scared? This question haunted me.” (Revathi, 2016; from the introduction ‘Beyond Black and White’ to A Life in Trans Activism; p. ix)

It has become impossible for people, particularly from certain sheltered social locations, to understand constant, dispersed, staggering, structurally embedded, hopelessly consuming fear and anxiety. Mustering a response to this fear and mistrust takes not only time and the presence of a validating space, but access to information, education, health, nutrition and affirming narratives of one’s histories. Most often, in a short life, this does not happen. Each of one’s struggles pulls one in some deeply bungled direction, one gets lost and one loses one’s lot. If these entangled struggles are in the queer universe the chances of coming out and thumping one’s chest with pride, if they do arise, often tend to erase pain, persistent betrayal and the loss of faith.

At this point in life, I would like to avoid doing this. If there is a chance to be a part of new structures of solidarity, I would first like to be ‘divisive’ and ‘separatist’ in my politics. I would like to acknowledge the loss of faith. I would like to go beyond not knowing, carefully, after first admitting to self the depths of not knowing. And in all cowardice, I have no intention of directly engaging with the authors, or their attendant, alienating political spaces. But for me to pursue a politics rooted in my identity, it is essential to clarify, in whatever way I can, the disagreements with the politics espoused in the book; so that I may find worthwhile directions of political engagement ahead. To that end, this is a selfish political act. This is largely a conversation with a self that has bungled through a savarna cis-heteronormative and cis-homonormative hypersexual world, as an OBC transgender asexual person.

About the book and my approach:

The book (of 250 pages), published by Zubaan Publishers (2015), provides to authors copyright (among other things) over the narratives of 50 respondents and an ‘idea’ of ‘plasticity’ of gender that they have offered in place of ‘fluidity’. The book is divided into 11 chapters with an additional note titled ‘Introduction and Context’. Out of these 11 chapters, chapters 4 through 10 (too neatly categorised as ‘The Early Years and Families’, ‘Experiences of Formal Education’, ‘Sport and Other Passions’, ‘Work and Livelihood’, ‘Public Spaces’, ‘Intimate Relationships’ and ‘The Self and the Body’) are truncated, selective narratives from the lives of the respondents. At no point here will I be referring to any of these narratives, in any manner, except if required to substantiate a point. The rest of the chapters, where the authors voices are alone present (almost as if in a white/savarna Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminist vacuum), will be what I argue with. These chapters are Method and Process (1), Profile of Respondents (2), A Gender of One’s Own (3) and Gender: Some Conclusions and the Path Ahead (11). In the following paragraphs I will try to look at the framing of their questions and contexts, their methodology and ethics, the manner in which narratives and bibliographical sources have been misrepresented and the ultimate (lack of) transformative potential of the theory they’ve offered.

Inconvenient questions, convenient contexts:

The authors’ stated objective is to ‘complicate the binary’ or ‘go beyond the binary’. Throughout the book they seem to be struggling with one central question of ‘what does transgender mean and who, then, is transgender’ (p. xi) – which they leave unanswered – that then appears in at least two more forms such as ‘why you are a woman’ (p. xii) and finally as ‘why you are ‘x’ gender’ (p. 230). The ultimate answer they seem to arrive at is feeble at best, ‘[W]e have learnt… that the question, ‘Why are you ‘x’ gender?’, seems to have no answer other than, ‘Because this is how I feel’ (p. 230). Read as it is this may seem radical, but by progressively diluting the political category and identity of ‘transgender’, erasing the term itself from the text, to be replaced with an ‘x’ – and its ‘feelings’, the authors take away the power of the composite, complete ‘being’ (as) a transgender person. You could counter this with the argument: don’t trans-people themselves say that they are this gender because this is how ‘they feel’[0]. I wouldn’t disagree completely. But here is the problem. When you systematically erase the term transgender from a text and replace it with a seemingly fluid ‘x’, you are required to qualify this very carefully. You are required to qualify the position from which you are seeking to erase a term from political and theoretical vocabulary. Do we have an answer to what this ‘x’ will be allowed to stand for? Who will decide these assignations? Without dismantling cis-man and cis-woman (terms that the authors have hardly used in their work towards ‘breaking the binary’), how do we recognize the true depth and breadth of this ‘x’ that you wish to arrive at? Historically, has not ‘transgender’ as a political category offered some of the most powerful critiques of the gender binary that the authors want to go beyond? Have transgender people not repeatedly stated ‘this is who I am’? (Insert background score: Shea Diamond’s ‘I am Her’). And therefore, is that not enough (whatever the bodily-discursive expression may be)?

If the authors recognized and accepted the validity and history of this political and theoretical category, and its powerful critique of ‘humanity’ in all its diversity and struggles, they wouldn’t frame their first question as some form of ‘who/what/why transgender’ (p. xi), leave it unanswered, and then follow it up with a pithy observation that this is a necessary but insufficient question, and that there are far more ‘crucial questions’ about ‘norms’ and ‘socio-political-cultural structures’ and ‘conformity/divergence’ (do we smell a ‘radical’ binary?) that need to be answered. Let me clarify this a bit more.

The authors state that ‘what does transgender mean and who, then, is transgender’ (p. xi) is a necessary but insufficient question. My contention is that they are far from the truth, and their methodology and final conclusions lay this bare. My truth is this: the question is itself irrelevant and any attempt of enquiry into categories of marginalized gender that begins with establishing ‘conditions’/‘standards’ of categorization (namely, who? Or, as the authors have used, a more dehumanizing, ‘what’?) is exclusionary and oppressive. The authors do not identify this very fundamental problem with the framing of their question, nor do they recognize its empirical undertones. And so, even though at first glance it seems they have left the question ‘unanswered’, the effort to establish conditions, categories, standards, and hierarchies of gender struggles unfold throughout the book. The politically radical moment for the authors would have been to establish unequivocally the necessity of assertion and self-determination of transgender and gender non-conforming identities and reflect on their own histories of insufficient engagement with the diverse evocations of trans-politics (feminist/otherwise).

Instead, they seem to wrap a warm blanket of comfort around themselves and draw out a very localized and evolutionary history of organizing rooted in cis-women’s movements they are familiar with. The authors draw out a story of the first responses to ‘why you are a woman’ beginning in 2001 in their feminist circles, of 1990s being an ‘intense period of activism in lesbian and gay organizing’ (in cities that are part of their networks only, with some examples of such well documented organizing), and end with this thoroughly unsubstantiated claim that ‘At that particular moment in history [whose history? Or is that no longer a cis-feminist question?], though, the stress was much more on sexuality, and issues around gender were not being addressed as clearly’ (p. xii-xiv). The authors repeatedly hark back to the women’s movements (the cis-savarna autonomous women’s movements) as their point of departure without acknowledging these and other LG spaces as being historically trans-exclusive, violently trans-negative. This could have been a moment to acknowledge the transgender people who were kept out of ‘women-only spaces’ and ‘elite queer only’ spaces. This could have been a moment to apologise even, if they so staunchly mark their roots in the cis-women’s movements. Because, that is how justice ought to work. But in one fell swoop their history-telling erases the record of this women’s movement’s (a space that they claim to be the first to address structures of gender and sexuality) participation in and continued practice of trans-exclusionary radical feminisms. Instead, they would rather acknowledge the ‘difficulty’ faced by practitioners of this ‘women’s movement’ politics to ‘wrap [our] heads and politics around the fact that many of those who are not socialized as women also feel like women. And the next logical step – that their lives and concerns were also as valid a concern of our work and movements as of those who were brought up as women – was even more difficult’ (pp. xv–xvi). When will this politics of patronage end? The hierarchies of movements and discourses are very clear to these authors: the cis-women’s movement is the first space, queer (strictly LG) organizing becomes the second space and in passing they mention ‘masculinity studies’ as a ‘third space’ in ‘contemporary discourses of gender’ (p. xxi). A history of transgender politics and organizing quietly removed, as these ‘difficult struggles’ and discourses of ‘wrapping their heads around’ transgender identities, are put on record.

Continuing on the path of erasing the systemic oppression of transgender people from political contexts, and assuming gender rights and sexuality rights to be in an evolutionary relationship (when we are done talking sexuality we will ‘adapt’ and start talking gender beyond women?) the authors also go on to express their panic around the increasing role of the State in fitting ‘multiple ways of being into yet another new straitjacketed category of transgender’ (p. xxii). I have no love lost for the State. But can we collectively balk at this particular – again, unsubstantiated – phrase: ‘new straitjacketed category of transgender’? This phrase succinctly expresses the ahistorical position of the authors; a position that allows them to simultaneously erase the history of transgender identity politics, introduce their text with a recent quote from the State machinery on transgender inclusion and conclude in standard liberal anti-state rhetoric that ‘oh shit oh shit, state is creating new category, need to oppose, need to oppose!’

Transgender history, life and politics cannot be reduced to a straitjacketed category. To be able to ‘wrestle’ with this reality it is required that one have complete respect and understanding for [trans]gender identity politics – irrespective of  political differences of opinion. You may critique me for my politics, but it must not be from a position of disrespect towards and invalidation or appropriation of my identities. You may critique me for my politics after explaining first, your understanding of my histories. You may offer your alternative after first appropriately engaging with the various alternatives already struggled through and articulated by the marginalized identities. That is, for me, trans-feminist integrity. And that is integral to the practice of trans-feminisms (the existence of which is not acknowledged in this book). Pushing the unsubstantiated argument that transgender is a straitjacketed category ‘under construction’ in the State discourse makes a mockery of all the struggles of identity, identification and difficult conversations that are taking place within various realms of the trans-community. In her book ‘A Life in Trans Activism’, A. Revathi (2016) gives us a clear picture not only of her individual struggles as an (outlawed) transwoman, but also the difficult paths of political articulation and activisms she traversed, with many others – and this was happening in the same time period when activism, according to the authors, focused only on ‘sexuality’. I reproduce below excerpts where Revathi talks about her daughter Famila, hijra, bisexual and feminist, and her articulations of gender and sexuality rights:

“Famila lived her life based on the principles she believed in…Through principles and practice, she challenged the norms of hetero patriarchal society that she felt was oppressive and unfair not only to women but to people who were of different gender and sexual orientation. She was the first person from the transgender community, who without fear or hesitation told the media that she was also a sex worker.
I must confess that until I met Famila, I was ashamed of being a sex worker and felt guilty and ashamed about it. But Famila helped me to realize that by subscribing to such negative stereotypes, I was indulging in self-hatred and discrimination–the very aspects of mainstream society that I was trying to address through my advocacy.

Famila’s home was an open house that overflowed with every denomination of sexual and gender minority people…She did sex work to support her large family whose members seemed to increase with every passing day. She was the first person from the hijra community who openly supported female to male trans persons or trans men…
This was something that even I did not expect her to do. Because even within the hijra community, female to male trans persons are not accepted, they are treated with contempt and scorn.” (Revathi, 2016: pp. 92-3)

These excerpts describe in short, the many layers, internal critiques, identity questions and multiple structural exclusions that transgender people, (across spectrums of gender and sexuality), have been engaging with for years now. It also describes the deep sense of alternate community building (not without their problems) that will not and cannot have singular articulations. An understanding that is completely lacking in the authors’ positions vis-à-vis trans identities. Hence it must be that they are quick to worry about the State ‘creating’ a ‘new straitjacketed category’ but spend hardly any time in their book to discuss a long history of violence by the State [1] directed at transgender people, and the difficult negotiations with the State – for citizenship and basic human rights – led by transgender people (which are ultimately responsible for the NALSA judgment) – that in turn have opened spaces for articulating and re-imagining gender; spaces that urgently need to be democratically supported and critically engaged with.

Coming to the second part of their premise (the first being that answering the question is necessary but insufficient): they say that there are other crucial questions about socio-political structures, norms etc that need to be answered.  They claim that in ‘this work…there has been a constant effort to see the intersections of various structures of society…’ (p. xx; Emphasis added). But they have not framed even one such question that tells us how authors have reflected upon or that invites the reader to reflect upon the oppressive structures, socio-political formations and the repetitive and tenacious nature of normative behaviours in society. Instead, all of these are taken as given, seen and the excerpts from 50 narratives are strategically placed within this ahistorical, empirical and unchanging frame to reinforce certain accepted notions around ‘acceptable’ gender transgressions. Ticking the columns is insufficient, the actual manner in which gender transgressions disrupt, challenge and sometimes evoke new norms needs to be excavated, the manner in which extant structures of the particular geographical context, i.e. india (as country with multiple states, not singular nation) participate with structures of gender need to be understood. If indeed the authors’ primary objective is to break the binary, how have they understood the construction of binary as it is done specifically in our geographical context? Do they recognize the primacy of the caste structure in this construction? Do they understand how femininities and masculinities are appropriated for the maintenance of caste purity? How do they understand the operation of violent female masculinities such as those celebrated by forces such as RSS and its Durga Vahinis, and its role in maintaining the patriarchal nation? Have they been able to locate the relations between labour, employment, caste, class and cis-masculinity? Or are they still crying over whether to accept or reject trans masculinities?

Trans activist, Gee Imaan Semmalar, writing about the anti-caste imperative in trans movements says, ‘The rejection of endogamous reproductive function by trans people means an abdication of the reproduction of caste relations and labour force making us lesser citizens of the Brahmin empire/Indian nation state.’ (Gee Imaan Semmalar, 2016). He also quotes Living Smile Vidya when talking about the exclusion from gainful employment, ‘As my sister Living Smile Vidya says, “Begging and sex work have become almost like fixed caste occupations for trans women in India.” The only other jobs are provided by NGOs which depend on HIV funding and retain feudal power structures of having cis, dominant caste people at the decision-making level in high salaried posts with trans women from lower caste backgrounds working in low-paid positions as condom distributors or community mobilisers. Having said that, the fact that NGOs provide a semblance of dignity in employment where a trans woman can work in an office rather than face public and police harassment doing street-based labour cannot be denied.’(Ibid)

Such analysis that drawn connections between various forms of exclusion, is wholly absent from the text of the book where identity specific exclusions are highlighted via narrative accounts (which, I argue, are used as empirical data) and little else is sought to be analysed outside immediate or known contexts.

On methodology, categories and ethics:

Susan Stryker, who has been duly noted in the bibliography (with no quote attributed to her appearing in the text of the book), speaks of the critical impetus of a ‘transgender will to life’:

“A transgender will to life thus serves as a point from which to critique the human as a universal status attributed to all members of the species, and to reveal it instead as a narrower set of criteria wielded by some to dehumanize others.”[2]

The authors, however, have shown a clear theoretical and political preference to stay within their own limited, narrow contexts and wield – powerfully – their own criteria, establish it as unchallenged, and continue to participate in erasing transgender histories and dehumanizing the ‘transgender’ will to life; instead of learning, critically engaging with, reinterpreting and expanding its ‘trans’-formative potential.

Now, you might counter this with the charge that I am being essentialist; why must everything speak to the transgender will to life? My response to this might seem at cross-purposes with your Universalist agendas, but the point is simple: it is the first ‘will to life’ sacrificed at the altar of small gains in gender justice. When the authors, speaking of the efforts for this book, say that they have interviewed 50 PAGFB identifying ‘queer in some way’ (p.xxiii) and that  ‘our effort has been to understand not just various gender identities, but gender itself in all its nuance and complexity’ (p. xxiv) the question one has is this: how can one claim to look at gender in all ‘its nuance and complexity’ (except that which has already been explicated from within the savarna cis-gender framework) while systematically and methodologically excluding transgender women, trans femininities, and PAGMB who are on the trans/agender spectrum? How can you fashion an ‘alternate theoretical universe’ for gender where there may be ‘no outlaws’, while methodologically outlawing an entire identity category of the gender spectrum from your political/theoretical and experiential universe?

As mentioned earlier, despite statements of radical inclusion, the primary preoccupations of the authors seem to be in creating new and ill-understood, easily misappropriated categories of inclusion and exclusion suited to their immediate contexts. And hence they are answerable to the transgender will to life, which vehemently resists (and loses life in resisting) such forced, decontextualised categorizations apparently (but without due credit) based on existing transgender political formulations.  The following are the stages of exclusion and forced categorizations that occur, as they have explained in their method and process, through this research.

At the point of selection of respondents: There are two counts on which they rationalize the exclusion of trans women/trans feminine/trans/fluid/agender PAGMB. One is that of taking on ‘too many varied lived experiences’ (p.6) and two is that since concerns of PAGFB trans* persons were not being foregrounded (p.6) this book proposes to focus on PAGFB narratives. Hopefully, you are noting the many contradictions of objectives and methodology here. Now, to their first point the response is simple, in trans-feminism there is no such thing as too many varied lived experiences. To respond to the second point, my argument is that the text is designed to fail in representing the concerns of trans persons assigned gender female.

To understand this at a simple empirical level we need to look at the next two stages, namely collection of data and the final analysis. Contrary to the rationale of foregrounding ‘PAGFB trans* persons’, the authors decide to ‘open up the study to include all PAGFB’ (p. 8) and then within that further focus only on ‘queer PAGFB, who identified as non-heteronormative in some way and allied with queer spaces or organizations.’ (p. 10) Here their rationale is, ‘in any case, that ‘same-sex desire’ becomes a violation of the gender norm too’ (p. 10). This is a limited understanding of the complicated relationship between gender and sexuality, that holds closer the established norms of sexualized queerness to the uncharted waters of genderered queerness and from the start skews the sample in favour of established queer spaces that have a limited (numerical and ideological) trans-representation, and an established, exclusionary language for understanding trans identities.

There are lessons for us to learn from the history of LGBT organizing the world over. There are identities which get left out or subsumed by existing queer spaces. For example, the presence of trans-identified female bodied persons in lesbian spaces. Trans needs have not been met, even recognized, in such spaces. Prevalent lesbian notions of ways of being are inadequate for trans needs. These notions do not enable/empower the trans-identified members of lesbian spaces. Another example would be the ongoing debate about who is the ‘koti’? (a male bodied person with female gender identity) The ‘koti’ is being understood as the ‘vernacular gay-identified person’ where as ‘she’ is clearly a transgender person.’ (Satya Rai Nagpaul, 2016; Where are all the f2ms?* Trans Visibility and Organizing in India; appearing in A. Revathi, 2016; p. 211)

‘Trans persons are not finding any meaningful space within existing queer/LGBT groups. These have in fact been and are increasingly being trans-unfriendly; even trans-phobic. Two days ago, I was told by a trans person, who belongs to a lesbian support group what the key person there said to him: ‘The day you reassign, you count yourself out of the group.’’ (Ibid; p. 213)

This is part of the history we are dealing with. And by going back to these same spaces, the authors reproduce the exclusions, as is clearly reflected in the profile of respondents (pp. 17-24) in the final analysis. Geographically, 46% of their respondents are from the combined areas of North and West India, 36% from South and only 18% from the East. 60% of their respondents are from ‘dominant’ castes (it is unclear what their iterations within ‘dominant’ exactly is), 22% are put under the combined category SC/ST/SBC and 18% is OBC and others. 84% of their respondents are Hindus, i.e. 42 out of 50. The educational qualifications show that only 32% have crossed their Bachelors, 38% are 12th pass or less. Monthly income profiles show that 38% are getting less than 10,000 INR and only 18% are getting more than 50,000 INR. These income and education statistics reveal very little about structural inequalities till we cross reference them with another classification i.e. current gender identification (they have used a three way classification of ‘women’, ‘men’ and ‘others’). Here, we see that 36% of the PAGFB respondents identify as Women (which means they identify with the gender assigned to them and may therefore be structurally located as cis-gender on the gender spectrum), only 20% identify as Men and another 36% identify as ‘Others’. They have not provided data that shows the income distribution across identities, but if we look at the educational levels across identities we see that 69% of those who have crossed BA are women, and 84% of those 12th pass or less were men and others. The authors’ justification (appears with respect to the religious profile and I extrapolate here generously) for this methodological skew in their sample appears as follows: ‘We also found that the make-up of the queer groups seemed to be largely reflective of mainstream society.’ (p. 19) The structural inequality here is not a matter of concern to the authors.

Of this limited and skewed sample, the authors accept that respondents who fell into their ‘others’ category were assigned places of some sort by the authors. “In each of these cases, we used our sense of the person’s gender as articulated in the whole of the interview to ascertain which category they fell most comfortably into.” (p. 27; Emphasis added). There is no clarity on how this was done, barring some examples, and most importantly, whether this categorization was acceptable to the respondent upon whom such assignation was made.

This goes against the idea of gender that they seem to argue for, something they refer to as ‘consensual gender’ (p.25, 238), which itself is a problematic notion. For a moment, even if we agree that gender may be consensual, it is clear that the authors have followed categorizations as they saw fit and have (by refusing to ground themselves in an ethical trans-feminist position) failed to practice any clear form of consent in categorization as well as failed to acknowledge existing hierarchies of power and position between categories and between the researcher and the researched, let alone develop a robust critique of such hierarchies. In fact, they unapologetically accept as much towards the end when they say ‘Their lived realities indicated to us that they had little in common beyond the fact that they were all assigned female gender at birth and hence, this seemed to aptly describe them. While this gender assignment does describe a certain commonality of experience, it does not reflect the diversity of experiences due to various other locations of class, caste, religion, ability and sexuality that PAGFB simultaneously inhabit (p. 238)’ Then what is the point of this utterly painful exercise of hashing and rehashing categories, to suit the authors’ temperaments and immediate analytical requirement, and then attempting to reduce all varied experiences into one button-holed and universalist category PAGFB, within which their political alignment in favour of cis-gender experience is amply evident? So even though they argue for they definitely do not practice consensual gender.

My truth is this – there cannot be such thing as consensual gender. Gender is unequivocally self-determined. That ‘self’ in self-determined may well be a relational being, located at multiple intersections, but their gender is self-determined. This is a fundamental and non-negotiable position vis-à-vis trans-politics. The politics of consent has developed through a very different trajectory in the gender and sexuality rights discourse. It speaks of the structural obstacles before someone who is denied the right to consent, it speaks of a person in a structural position of power having the onus of seeking consent – as many times as required – when engaging in a sexual, bodily interaction with another person. It speaks of the discursive limits of consent. From there it also develops a discourse of multiple languages of consent, deconstructs situations of complete impossibility of consent and making consent an integral part of all conversations around sex acts in particular and sexuality/sexual exploration in general. In this discourse, while recognizing the systemic denial of right to consent to marginalized gender locations, a determinist understanding of gender (or age or ability) becomes irrelevant (even as the structural location of the oppressor needs to be underscored). In the broadest frame then, consent is a conversation between people seeking a specific relationship with each other, all the while navigating the difficult terrain of hierarchies, power, bodily reality, ability, labour, desire, pleasure, pain and health[3].

Gender, on the other hand, is an intensely personal conversation of self with one’s own body and its multiple identities, all the while navigating the difficult terrain of hierarchies, power, body, ability, desire, pleasure, pain, health and imagination. Consent itself can be incontrovertibly self-determined. But self-determined gender needs no consent, and at its most empowered moment seeks no consent. Arguing for, or loosely teaming up these separate concepts can be counterproductive to the politics of trans identity struggles. In the current context of heightened state intervention (something the authors have noted, but not dealt with), the government of india is tending towards a reversal from the NALSA position of complete self-determination of gender to greater intervention and surveillance of identities[4], the authors may not have considered the following: to own one’s body and affirm one’s identity is to declare that one requires no individual or institution’s consent over such ownership, as well as that one has no business giving consent to others for the ownership of their body and expression of their genders; no institutional (State/medical/familial) or community gate-keeping can be allowed; no consensus, in other words, need be arrived at regarding the gender identity of an individual – it is what I determine it to be, for as long as it is so determined by me. Any conversation must begin from the complete acceptance of this.

Here I will take a moment to also underscore the faulty alignments of choice and assignation that the authors have decided to undertake. The authors say that ‘Each person also lives within the realm of their imagined body, whatever be their gender, whether assigned by society or chosen by oneself.’ (p. 234; Emphasis added) This is the catch – particularly in queer discourses where the authors claim that same sex relations are already challenging gender norms — only when chosen and claimed by self (within one’s own limits), does the assigned gender become the person’s gender. Till then it is simply that, assignation by the powers that be. There is no easy choice for sure, but the easiest by far is to chose the assignation and make it one’s own. There is no assigned gender identity and chosen gender identity – all gender identities are self-determined.

As with the idea of consensual gender (a phrase used in passing in the text) we can also quickly challenge the theoretical basis of the idea of ‘plasticity’ that they offer. As clear from the bias in the methodology, any attempt at a theoretical generalization is futile and only deepens the bias inherent in the methodology.  (One implication of this is that even if ‘plasticity’ were a theoretical possibility, it would be so only for those who are not already outlawed by the structures of society.) The authors claim that ‘plasticity’ may be used instead of ‘fluidity’ to understand the gender system. Here again, they repeat the fundamental flaw of reflecting a deep seated fear of robust and diverse identity politics onto the process of theory building itself. It seems the authors have taken ill-understood identity categories, associated narratives, excluded a large majority of narratives and arrived at their own understanding of gender and gender systems. The authors, in their urge to theorize, do not differentiate between gender identities and gender systems/structures. They do not offer a sufficient reason for replacing fluid with plastic, nor a meaningful engagement with their idea of plasticity. Links between the narrative histories mentioned earlier in the text and the intervention of plasticity are not clear, or perhaps not even existent. Is plasticity a characteristic of gender expression, an identity position on the gender spectrum, or an element to understand the gender system or all of it? What are the interpretations from each angle? Though they say that plasticity is used as a characteristic of gender, the discussion is pretty sparse and depends solely on the validation of a random quote from one Mr. Bingham’s 1922 text called Fluidity and Plasticity that deals with physical chemistry.

First of all, it is abominable that transformations and expressions of a person’s gender identity must be compared (without context) to shape changing solids being ‘deformed’, ‘worked’, ‘molded’ under ‘shearing stresses’ (p.233). It reeks of the dangerously experimental processes undertaken by medico-legal establishments upon gender non-conforming bodies, even provides them uncertain ‘scientific sanction’.

Secondly, it doesn’t stand the test of personhood and self-determination. If we understand the extent to which trans and non-conforming gender identities have been dehumanized, objectified and in certain select spaces unduly sexually fetishised we will be careful about arriving at such characterizations of gender without due thought. When the authors say (about plasticity) that ‘people occupying definite identities and locations, even though they might shift shape over time or move from one location to another’ (p.233) they are collapsing gender into body and biology – fixing it – and then focusing on the possibility of ‘shifting shape’ or ‘change’. They are going against everything they have earlier mentioned by – in the particular context of transcending bodily boundaries -defining gender in and as a material body that has a ‘before/after’ trajectory of ‘change’. They also compare ‘plasticity of gender’ with the everyday meaning of plastic or synthetic. The dichotomies being maintained here are internal/external, organic/synthetic and felt/made. Apart from maintaining the before/after trajectory, the relationship between two is again designed as former influenced by the latter. Unintentionally as it were, the authors have reduced their elaborate intervention around understanding gender and gender expression to the matter of bodily alterations – without adequately appraising themselves or the reader of the many complicated narratives surrounding this one much inflated aspect of trans lives i.e. medically assisted transition, including hormone therapy and gender affirming surgeries.

By seeking to replace fluidity with plasticity they have challenged (without much basis) the identity categories, ‘gender fluid’, ‘amorphous’ and ‘agender’ – categories that have come into existence over a long period of time – and again leaves very little scope for self-determination. Which brings forth the question – when we understand gender identities as self-determined, located on a considerably vast spectrum of identities and mediated by multiple graded hierarchies of the social location of (a)gendered persons, what is the theoretical/political potential offered by plasticity? Perhaps rheologist Bingham from 20th century Britain may have an answer.

Essentialist feminism and the misrepresentation of trans-theorists:

The authors claim a feminist methodology and political position. What is this position and who does it favour? My argument is that the authors come from a very problematic cis-savarna feminist position that speaks to cis/savarna gender categories and values their gender struggles over and above transgender struggles. The authors validate only the experience and practice of a certain kind of cis-feminism; one that grudgingly accepts, ‘includes’ and often ‘favourably’ (for self) appropriates limited elements of transgender struggles wherever possible. In doing so they constantly seek to establish that ‘everybody’ faces gender struggles, but there are specific feminist struggles and those are of the women.  In chapter 3 they make a comparison of individual struggles in this manner: after quoting one of the respondents, who is a cis-woman, talking about how as a working woman she doesn’t meet societal standards of being a woman, the author’s say – ‘We may reads in ____’s assertion a continuing of the feminist project of pushing boundaries and further liberating the category of ‘woman’’ (p. 28) This is immediately followed by a quote from a respondent who identifies as a boy, talking about a childhood memory and the arrival at their identity. The authors’ response to this is as follows – ‘All our ‘man’-identified respondents were able to express their gender through clothes and behaviour in public places, as well as in interactions with others.’ (p. 29)

A cis-woman’s assertion of her working woman identity evokes imagery of the continuation of a feminist project; a transman’s assertion of his gender identity evokes a pithy generalization about gender expression which is both untrue and empirically invalid (given the very small size of their sample).

In chapter 10 where they try to talk about gendered bodies, they make a clear separation between the ‘female’ body and the ‘visible’ body. Here they assert that women had their ‘fair share of negotiation with gendered expectations of the body’ (p. 189) and speak at length about how cisgendered doesn’t mean complete comfort with the body. The ‘visible’ body is described only in relation to its departure from the ‘female’ body – where the female body is taken as its idealized cis-heteronormative versions, and differences are marked in terms of ‘gender expressions’, and some ‘bodily markers’. The very idea of the ‘female’ body and the ‘male’ body is left unchallenged. Moreover the male body of transgender people is not named as such, rather forcefully locked into the biologically ‘female’ and left there to either ‘converge’ or ‘diverge’. In this brand of defeatist feminist project, self-determined bodies and identities are important only in so far as they reflect or reject established norms, thereby further reifying these norms. And any attempt to separate the discourse, and establish an independent narrative will evoke epistemological violence as follows:

While it is clear that trans*persons face brutal violence due to the gender binary, they are not the only ones. Such violence has to be understood in conjunction with the violence that ‘women’ face within the same heteronormative patriarchal system. Recognising cis privilege and understanding how it operates is crucial and needs to be more and more part of the ongoing discussions in queer and feminist spaces, but it would be incorrect to say that trans*persons are the only ones fighting gender battles. Every time the gender expression of a person does not match their perceived identity, the person is subjected to intense scrutiny, which is often violent. Hence, ciswomen, cismen too, who defy the norms of masculinity and femininity have to fight long hard battles with little or no support.” (p.228)

In one succinct paragraph not only is the transphobia intrinsic to queer cis-gender perspectives laid bare, but also the inherited savarna insecurity of different ‘causes’ forming and strengthening within and outside the established spaces of ‘one unified white/savarna radical dreamy queer feminist movement’.  The whole book comes across as an exacting exercise in stating ‘not-all-cispeople’ (much like the hashtag not-all-men or all lives matter!). Indeed, they would rather speak about gender battles of cismen than open up their ideological and support spaces for transwomen.

For the authors, feminism is not practiced and cannot be embodied in transgender bodies. Trans people are mere cogs who rotate in the expanding universe of outlawed genders, quietly absorbing anything that comes their way, not thinking for themselves or challenging norms in any way. They take a wholly insulting position with respect to trans men when they say ‘It is not surprising, then, for example, that a PAGFB who identifies as ‘man’ will adopt those traits of masculinity that are prevalent around him. If dominant ways of being ‘masculine’ are not under scrutiny in his society by and large, then these will not be readily reflected in his way of being a man. In all probability the prevalent traits might be even more obvious, in the sense that a transman might seem more masculine to us because that is what he is projecting as a gender cue in order to gain acceptance for his gender identity.’ (p. 231) For the authors, trans-feminist iterations and positions do not exist and so they have not also sought to excavate such positions through their methodology.

This brings me to one final aspect of the discussion. The misrepresentation of trans/gender theorists, particularly with respect to medical interventions and bodily alterations. It is very clear that the authors have taken a position against medical interventions or body alterations, even without openly saying so. They have only scarcely referenced and never critically engaged with trans/gender theorists and activists in the book. Riki Anne Wilchins’ (consistently misspelled as Rikki Ann Wilkins!) ‘What Does it Cost to Tell the Truth?’[5] is used to advocate that violence is faced not ‘only’ by trans*persons (decontexualised quote appears on p. 228). What Wilchins is arguing in this piece is almost diametrically opposite. Wilchins is thoroughly and quite profoundly marking the difference between those whose ‘truthful’ self is relatively closer (i.e. cisgender people, who may nonetheless have their own struggles) to cultural norms and those whose ‘truths’ come at great costs. A reality that these authors are simply unwilling to accept and understand.

They also quote Dean Spade from his work ‘Mutilating Gender’ to claim that trans/gender nonconforming persons enter into forced compromises (a term not used by Spade himself) with the medical establishment when they seek body alterations. The quote from his work is followed up with these assertions: ‘As mentioned earlier, the limits of transgression are often built into the systems of control and reproduction since this helps sustain these massive systems while maintaining fictions of flexibility and accommodation. We believe that even in a society where more and more gender and body variations are accepted, people might still want medical changes.’ (p. 236) It is the second sentence that I would like to emphasize – even in a society where ….variations are accepted…people might still want medical changes. Does that mean that the ideal is to NOT want medical changes? Does that mean the onus of change still lies on people fitting into different variations that may/may not be accepted (a huge gamble there) rather than the medical establishment itself taking up the onus of losing its oppressive histories? And is that what Spade is hinting at?

Not in the least. Through his work in Mutilating Gender[6], Spade is arguing for very different things than what the authors have gathered. Indeed he is seeking for people to not pretend as though SRS (or gender affirming surgeries) is this process through which hapless transgender/transsexual ‘victims’ are forced into conforming to the gender binary (the subtext being that the onus of diverging from/conforming to the binary is NOT on trans people, and that divergence/conformity is not a simplistic narrative). He is focusing on the many ways in which transpeople navigate and negotiate the ever expanding powers that be. He seeks to ‘critique’ the containment of ‘gender distress’ within the invented norms of ‘transsexualism’ by gatekeepers of medico-legal institutions. He asks, ‘If we start from an understanding that gender behavior is learned… how can a desire to transgress an assigned gender category be read outside of cultural meaning?’ Here I read the implied query to psychiatrists, cis-feminists and sociologists that how can opting for SRS be a ‘return’ or a ‘regress’? He asserts that an ‘arbitrary line’ has been drawn ‘between technology and body’ and placed at ‘sex-change procedures’. He says of theorists, such as these authors, who picnic on transsexual identity, ‘They fail to include in their analysis the fact that people…change their gender presentation to conform to norms with multiple other technologies as well, including clothing, make-up, cosmetic surgery not labeled SRS, training in gender specific manners, body building, dieting and countless other practices.

He values the trans-activist space and its power of disrupting the narratives enforced by medical institutions. He says, and I do concur from my own experiences, ‘I’ve found that in trans contexts, a much broader conception of trans experiences exists. The trans people I’ve met have, shockingly, believed what I say about my gender. Some have a self-narrative resembling the medical model…some do not…Wilchins posits an idea of identity as “an effect of political activism instead of a cause”. I see this notion reflected in trans activism, writing, and discussion, despite its absence in the medical institutions through which trans people must negotiate our identities.’ This underscores the agential and transformative potential of trans/gender non-conforming lives and identities beyond normative boundaries. It states emphatically that which the authors here have not understood: that the trans identities have already broken the binary in multiple ways, and at great cost too. The struggle is to understand this history, to take this forward, to sustain the movement, to engage with trans activism as trans activism and more, to not fall into the trap of using trans narratives as an additive layer to incomplete, essentialist and hackneyed theories of gender that only assist certain acceptable divergences.

And so it is that Spade sees surgery and negotiations with medical establishments in a much more nuanced way than these authors do. He underscores the scary reality of norms and how it can deny us access to surgery. He says, ‘Even though I don’t believe in real, it matters if other people see me as real – if not I am a mutilator, an imitator, and worst of all I can’t access surgery.’ It is easy for authors to see this as ‘forced compromise’ that ‘hapless trans people’ outside ‘white/savarna radical cis-feminist ideals of untainted, untouched bodies’ undertake. By reducing their engagement to only this interpretation they reduce trans lives and ideas of conformity/divergence to the extent of body alterations. Everything else disappears – the wealth of dissent and dialogue that has happened between trans activists and medical establishments, the small ways in which the medical establishment has been challenged and made more accountable, the non-surgical medical and healthcare needs of trans people that never gets talked about, the slow (and very recent) replacement of GID with the term dysphoria, and the unequal treatment of sexual non-conformity and gender non-conformity within the medical paradigm that allows for the former to no longer be a ‘deviant condition’ in Western medico-legal discourse.

Spade clarifies his political project as follows, ‘My project would be to promote sex reassignment, gender alteration, temporary gender adventure, and the mutilation of gender categories, via surgery, hormones, clothing, political lobbying, civil disobedience, or any other means available.’ He asserts, ‘…I reject the narrative of a gender troubled childhood.’ This is important, not because we need to invalidate gender troubled childhoods, but because that narrative should not be compulsory or singular. That narrative offers only a simplistic evolutionary perspective of human lives, heavily misused by the medico-legal establishment. The authors here also arrange the narratives in this simplistic manner, dividing their respondents’ stories into neat categories from childhood to work, leaving little space for reflections beyond linear storytelling. That the authors have not nearly grasped the many layers of Spade’s arguments in Mutilating Gender is apparent.

A final note on terminology and a conclusion:

The authors have alluded to the absence of adequate languages to fully capture meanings of gender non-conformity. When they set out to introduce the text they say, ‘For many people who break the gender binary, there is no popular terminology to describe their realities in ways that feel affirmative, while access to discourses in other languages, such as English, is usually a matter of class privilege. It is in the groups and collectives that are working to evolve a more inclusive lexicon, then, that these gender non-conformists are able to find not just a community but also a language that lets them feel they finally belong.’ (p. xxvii) These are standard caveats. And it is known (within the limited circles of gender politics) that there is staunch disagreement of terminologies that is on-going, wherein the introduction of terms such as PAGFB has been challenged. Personally, I am very happy with ‘transgender person’. I have arrived here after rejecting queer and only trans* that I used to earlier uphold. I am happy with transgender asexual person because I have now spent a considerable amount of time engaging with terminologies and their histories and political implications. Unlike queer (which was ‘reclaimed’/’subverted’ from a slur[7] and still has no space for asexual expression), the origins of transgender terminologies are taken by the community[8] however complicated its meanings and understanding of sex and gender differences. In earlier contexts I have mentioned that I find PAGFB/PAGMB useful to indicate assignation (though they are not my preferred terms) and misidentification, as well as to explore multiple directions and journeys of transition/transgression. But the methodological pitfalls of the term (however useful it may be for administering services only) come to fore in this work. The authors have carelessly bundled all narratives together as a ‘universal political category’ (NOT as an administrative category) and created their own set of categories as well (mentioned earlier). They seem to have taken some effort to simply not use the term transman in their text, even going to the extent of using unqualified terms such as ‘non-cisman’ (p. 22) and everywhere the term man/boy is used to signify self-identification, for some reason it is set in quotes. Within their categorization of ‘Others’ one will find identities such as ‘ftm’, ‘Man but…’ as well as an intersex person, all bundled together. The critique of gender from a trans perspective is unimaginably different from that of an intersex perspective, their notions of identity, the extent of support in reclaiming bodies from medical violence are all so different (and I am ill-equipped to represent it here). Such vague and misdirected additions to the terminology soup are best avoided and the histories of terms be staunchly interrogated.

In conclusion, it is difficult to find any political use to which the arguments/analysis of the book can be put. It is clear that their politics and methodologies are skewed towards securing cisgender struggles, where intersectionality is merely additive in nature and a thoroughly oppressed gender category is merely a decontextualised layer to be added to existing cis-feminist theorizing. This they clarify when they say, ‘Varied transgressions, actually offer newer ways of living the binary as well. It is in all our collective interests to facilitate this opening up of the binary. This will also help transform many of the cisgender gender battles.’ (p. 238) So, one wonders, if cisgender battles are won, will they no longer wish to break the binary?

To quote Spade, quoting Wilchins, in Mutilating Gender – ‘Riki Anne Wilchins describes how trans experience has been used by psychiatrists, cultural feminists, anthropologists, and sociologists “travel[ling] through our lives and problems like tourists . . . [p]icnicking on our identities . . . select[ing] the tastiest tidbits with which to illustrate a theory or push a book.”[7].  In most writing about trans people, our gender performance is put under a microscope to prove theories or build “expertise” while the gender performances of the authors remain unexamined and naturalized.’

In my assessment No Outlaws in the Gender Galaxy continues this trend, but strategically (and therefore more dangerously) masks it under the garb of a methodology that claims that the researchers are engaging with ‘people like them’ (p.3). This danger is made very clear when they first align themselves with Halberstam (an eminently problematic figure) and then say, ‘we belong to the school of thought that allies itself with the ‘subversive intellectual’ who agrees to steal from the university, to ‘abuse its hospitality’ and to be ‘in but not of it’ (Moten and Harney 2004: 101)’ (p.xxviii). My contention remains that they have hardly been to the university to steal anything for this book. Instead they have stolen from trans histories, abused our hospitality and continue to be around but never in or of it. I am reminded of an event to discuss the Trans Rights Bill 2016, held at a social sciences university in Bombay. The issue of bathrooms came up again, and a cisgender student from women’s studies asked the panel this: ‘won’t women give up all that they have struggled for if bathrooms become unisex?’ When books such as this reach university spaces, as they easily will, it will strengthen such ill-advised voices as they challenge the most marginalized, instead of reflect on their participation in keeping structures of oppression alive. If consensual gender were to become a thing, we will have to continue queuing up with our ID cards in front of the bathroom, seeking permission to pee.

I end with a quote from ‘Oru Malayali Hijadayude Athmakatha’ ( can be translated as ‘The Autobiography of a Malayali Hijra’) by Jereena.

In front of the house, there used to be a photo of me dressed as a woman. Kohl in my eyes, a bindi on my forehead, rose powder on my cheeks, lipstick on my lips, earrings in my ears, it was a very beautiful picture. My brothers had removed it. When I asked them where it was, they said that people seeking marital liaisons with their sisters might see the photo and ask who it is and so they removed it. They had questioned, challenged my femininity. I held on till my brother’s wedding got over. Two days after the wedding, when no one was watching, I took a train back to Bangalore.’ (Jereena, 2006; p. 53)[9]   

If you would like to believe that there are no outlaws in the gender galaxy, perhaps it is time to look again. Because your telescopes are pointed at the spots from where our photos have been removed.

Bibliography:

  1. Revathi. 2016. A Life in Trans Activism. Zubaan Publishers, Delhi
  2. Gee Imaan Semmalar. 2016. Why Trans Movements in India Must Be Anti-Caste. Accessed from http://www.trans.cafe/posts/2016/12/12/why-trans-movements-in-india-must-be-anti-caste
  3. Satya Rai Nagpaul. 2016. ‘Where are all the f2ms? Trans Visibility and Organizing in India.’ In Revathi, 2016. A Life in Trans Activism (Ch. 18). Zubaan Publishers, Delhi
  4. Jereena. 2006. Oru Malayali Hijadayude Athmakatha. Papyrus Books, Calicut.
  5. Shah, C. Merchant, R. Mahajan, S. Nevatia, S. 2015. No Outlaws in the Gender Galaxy. Zubaan Publishers, Delhi.

Notes:

[0] See this piece on (among other things) the false dichotomy between transwomen’s feelings and cis-women’s experiences – https://feminisminindia.com/2017/03/17/othered-womanhood-adichie-trans-women/

[1] Most recently, Tara a transwoman from Tamil Nadu was brutally murdered by the police leading to numerous protests and demonstrations led by transwomen http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/transgender-woman-dies-chennai-she-was-found-burnt-outside-police-station-52639

[2] http://www.boundary2.org/2014/08/transgender-studies-today-an-interview-with-susan-stryker/

[3] Please see this discussion (between Zoe Samudzi and @pastachips) on the spectrum of consent, the notion of enthusiastic consent and dangers of uncritical sex positivity – https://storify.com/samudzi/on-sex-positivity-and-empowerment

[4] See Nadika N’s piece on the 2016 Transgender Persons Bill here – http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/transgender-persons-bill-it-claims-grant-rights-will-end-curtailing-them-47649

[5] Text sourced from here – http://sites.middlebury.edu/soan191/files/2013/08/wilchinsReadMyLips2.pdf

[6] Text sourced from here – http://www.makezine.enoughenough.org/mutilate.html

[7] See with caution and a critical lens http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/32213/1/tracing-the-history-of-the-word-queer and https://www.bustle.com/articles/139727-is-the-word-queer-offensive-heres-a-look-at-its-history-in-the-lgbtqa-community

[8] See http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/debunking-origin-behind-word-transgender

[9] This is not an official translation, but done in parts by me for the purpose of this piece. All errors are mine.

 

A Tale of Seven Goodbyes

(…and some queer happiness)

One for a smile,
One for a touch,
One for words as such.

One for the mother
One for the friend
One for the road’s forever bend.

One for myself.

They said i’m happy.
A sad guess perhaps –
Sometimes, happiness is queer too.

 

 

 

By way of an identity and epitaph

(a.k.a. Perils of a job search)

I can see it happening now.

The blade usually comes out of a fold
in the sleeve.
It gently works on the skin
around the neck.
It has a pace; a distance;
and a timekeeper – this blade.
The question it’s asking:
‘hey you! What’s under your skin?’
Evil smile, ‘here, let me find out.’
Your neck feels like a sheet of burst bubble wrap.
Wet and a wee bit sticky.

At other times it is a bit easier.

The knife is stuck to the ground
in a pretty pile of mould.
Falling, stomach first, arms reaching out
to hug pokey gravel.
It is quick, stoic, and mighty
unwieldy all at once – this knife.
Into your stomach, and out thru’ the back.
No questions, no courtesies.
Just the sound of steel through flesh.
You can’t move any more; you’re dead
so they leave, as one last act of kindness –

A CV flap-flapping,

On your dead behind,

By way of an identity and epitaph.

T-Shirts – the possibility of poetry

Did I tell you how much I love
wearing t-shirts?

The boxes arrived at home – not mine,
just a home – yesterday.

One half of one among three boxes of stuff hoarded
for four years lived in seven houses

Were just t-shirts.
Of different sizes.

Stolen, given, gifted, taken, and
just two that were bought.

The ghost of this home has emptied a shelf for ‘my’ rags
and she doesn’t even know why I love them so.

One of them is yours, a t-shirt – friend?
I’ve stolen.

Not for smelling at night, or wrapping around broken memories.
Nor for simply hoarding as a useless relic in the name of love.

One of them, a t-shirt – friend? I’ve stolen
To be able to hope

For that small mirror-less room where I could wear it as mine
and you could stand beside me and smile.

Can I wish you happy holidays?

Wry laughter.
It’s dry weather.
Can I wish you happy holidays?

Wry laughter.
It’s dry weather.
A bloody dry.

Knock, knock, can I wish you happy holidays?

Pardon! Our doors closed
The minute you got on the boat.
Send a postcard, please?

Wry laughter.
It’s dry weather.
A bloody dry.

There’s smoke from bullets, bombs and crackers
everywhere.
Tracing the vapid assumption of instinctual humanity
everywhere.
Instinctual humanity, the timeless automaton.

Laugh, please.
And remember the lessons on instincts;
They never taught you how to have a conversation.

Instincts taught you how to hide my stammer.

Hide.
Wry laughter.
It’s dry weather.
A bloody dry.

Knock, knock, can I please wish you happy holidays?

You pick the pieces of your broken mirror
and slice through your shady conscience
The girl on the streets is laughing at your tears
She can’t come too close, share your air

Or even pick up the shards to sell,
You might hiccup over a tear and set your dog on her.

You orgasm, with shame, over the blood dripping
from the palm of your hand
And remember the Father’s words
now sprinkled over a billion national anthems:
Remember, son, to only –
Feel one with your blood brother.
Do not sleep with your sister.
And please wear some pure leather.

Our insurance will have you covered.

The girl on the streets is walking on the shards
you’ve left behind.

Wry laughter.
It’s dry weather.
A bloody dry.

Instincts tell you to moisturise.
There’s some in the purse of your wife.

knock, knock, can I wish you happy holidays?

These are not even your holidays.
So no, you can’t.

Between a Fascist and a Psychotic

i remember the time
they told me hitler was crazy.
some said he was abused,
some said he was artsy, gay
and had epilepsy.

unsettled is my hold on logic
by their placement of ‘and’ in between

the words ‘artsy’, ‘gay’ and ‘epilepsy’, when it could
have very well been an ‘also’; but hell who is to know?
what happened to maybe?
and an and swiftly made a bridge under a carpet
with cunning; imaginations building footpaths unchecked,

hysterical.

‘Why am I not
a fascist goon?’ is a rare question to ask oneself.
or there are more synonyms for fascism than must be
known; the question hangs by the comma of each semi-colon
separating the words of a thesaurus;

unkind.

did i hear the cuckoo sing me my biography
as i lost my job, home, and all semblance of facial expression?
did i hear the cuckoo sing, and sing, the refrain
with hints of a lilting alliteration, ‘that –
la-la-la-la – is
how he held himself – a
consummate captive – to
fulsome fascist fools – sush!

perhaps it was a parrot. and
I am not a he.

i gave in – little by little
while the streets came alive without a mask
smiling faces, extended arms, nimble feet
compressed bodies, open eyes, noise and voice.
i opened my mouth: could you hear
my tongue turn limp, and fall

hard?

trying to find a cause, but instead i
found a roll call, sleeping hall and practised expressions
in a public toilet stall.
With the ease and beat of the ‘ands’ and ‘likes’,
neither as metaphor, nor as simile,
I find a private corner to hit my head against the wall
literally, without cause.

‘Are you a fascist goon?’

i try to forget hitler, and jog my bruised memory
to the point where i wasn’t.

help.

Love Letter to A Movie

I’ve seen you in parts, in whole,
Sent threaded needles of my thoughts,
to patch over your plot holes –
Set to the raunchy score of my life’s disappearing goals.

Every night for the last twenty seven nights,
I’ve felt you unfold in the deep end
Of my empty bed lying in a noiseless pit of this city –
A bay of pirates, hoarders and people in dread flight.

Angles cameramen overlooked,
Beats musicians missed,
Dialogues writers feared,
Cuts editors should’ve made.

All lie noted in my basket of crumpled scripts for you;
But you, sleight of hand, are already made.
The only button to push is Download –
With a quick glance at fickle ads, views, and reviews.

And since, I’ve seen you in parts, in whole,
Sent threaded needles of my thoughts,
to patch over your plot holes –
Set to the raunchy score of my life’s disappearing goals.

Now you’re the only voice in my head
Feeble conversations, like we’re all dying or dead
I’m there in the screen and you’re here filling up my bed
You wanted me to see you, but I close my eyes and smell you instead.

Tongues I have spoken,
Places I have been,
People I have loved,
Music I have made.

They don’t matter anymore.
Because you, sleight of hand, are already made.
And you refuse to tell my tale, so I live yours and whisper mine,
In the black between end and credits, a few unaccounted snores.

Ennu Ninte Moideen: Loveless Notes to Kerala

I have decided to set aside my life for him. He is now looking for a job in the gulf… he says he will try to find me one too. If we both get a job then great…he might get married if his family asks him to…I won’t stop him…he has to do what he has to… but I will still be with him… if he goes, I will wait…

– A gay, malayali, cis-man who works as a mason in one of Kerala’s cities.

R.S. Vimal’s Ennu Ninte Moideen is an eyesore in the name of love; and not just any love, but idealized ‘secular’, ‘revolutionary’ love in Kerala. I use the word eyesore very carefully. Because there is nothing to listen to, hear, in the movie except a few clichéd and hollow statements masquerading as ‘dramatic’ dialogues and some really well arranged songs. I use the word eyesore because it has been packaged as a visual treat and all it does is plonk itself before an audience (that has been carefully prepped to not reject such a ‘divine’ love story) and look pretty. The actors look pretty and every effort is made to showcase their ‘natural’ beauty, the sets look pretty and every effort is made to showcase their ‘natural’ beauty, the rain looks pretty, the Theyyam, Mohiniyattam and Kathakali [all fitted into one song] look pretty, the mud looks pretty. But they pretty much amount to nothing more than very well shot and indiscriminately arranged montages meant to tell a linear tale that is both factually fudged up and politically insensitive, betraying the ethical tendencies and moral location of the filmmaker.

(The creation of) A Palatable Upper Caste-Class Legend of Love[1]

…as told through the misrepresented ‘eyes’ of a dead man, who happens to be a ‘progressive’ Muslim.

It is extremely important to remember that most of the people closely associated with the story being told are still alive, especially the purported heroine, Kanchanamala. This raises a whole range of ethical issues that are not limited to changing names, places and other half-hearted modes of maintaining so-called anonymity. Indeed that limited conversation of ethics doesn’t arise here given that Kanchanamala as well as surviving members of Moideen’s family have been quite vocal about their story. Instead that very pigeon-holed notion of filmmaking ethics itself will be used in terms such as ‘adaptation’, ‘poetic license’, ‘filmmaker’s vision’, ‘fictionalisation’ and its many variants to advocate for the fudging and skewing in a story telling that lends complete ownership and power to the story teller/filmmaker, who then repeatedly gets away with merely sticking to skeletal facts of the story.

Before understanding how the filmmaker has failed repeatedly to answer the ethico-political questions that are central to telling such stories let us first underscore a few of those questions. I don’t intend to make an exhaustive list [that should have been done by the filmmaker] but here are a few: what perspectives must one take while telling this story? And more importantly, whose perspectives? What is the intent of telling this story, and how can it be told differently? Is this story a window into the worlds that were colliding at that time [1960s] in that geographical/cultural space [Mukkam, Kerala]? What is the enunciation of love that one hopes to achieve through this filmmaking?

My argument is this: the filmmaker has actively chosen to convert what could have been a useful and critical historical narrative of the roots of the perverse caste patriarchal morality pervading Kerala today into a “legendary, secular, divine love tragedy” draining it of all its political possibilities and re-affirming a universal inescapability of status-quo; the filmmaker has erased Kanchanamala’s perspective, story and position almost completely, created anew a Moideen perspective where there was none, while drafting both Moideen and Kanchanamala into moulds of flawless, progressive, superior humanity; the filmmaker has erased the perilous labour of those ‘lower caste’ persons who worked to keep their love afloat against all odds; the filmmaker has been unfaithful to the milieu and time that he claims to be representing by romanticizing their lives, narratives as well as the unshakeable violence of it all.

To understand the filmmaker’s inclinations it is essential to return to the documentary [dramatically titled Jalam Kondu Murivettaval; “One who was wounded by water”] made in 2006. The preface to this documentary, bursting at its seams with the sound of rain, contains the following words: ‘The story of the great sacrifice of Kanchana who dedicated herself to the memory of Moideen’. A few minutes into the documentary after we’ve been presented with scenes of Kanchana on a boat [sidenote: in another interview she says that she has till date not used the boat and prefers to use the road since going near the river is too traumatic for her, but those considerations are perhaps not relevant for this filmmaker] he asks us the question ‘who is Kanchana?’ and immediately offers a response as follows: ‘one who painfully cherished everlasting love in her own lifetime; though it may be small compared to Christ, Kanchana’s sacrifice is eternal.’ You are welcome to twist your head around this comparison between a surviving, struggling, changing, mortal human being and an immortal, magical, figure head of an organized religion. Throughout the documentary, when the filmmaker is not attempting to dramatize the tale beyond recognition and repeatedly referring to ‘orthodox’ ‘aristocratic’ families, there is much to be heard from Kanchana about how their relationship evolved and how she perceived Moideen as well as the milieu in which she lived/lives[2]. That the filmmaker has not listened to or considered any of it relevant enough to make it to his ‘magnum opus’, his own personal ‘romeo-juliet’ is telling.

Consider the extended moment when Kanchana perceives Moideen’s eyes upon her and begins toying with the idea of Moideen as a romantic and sexual partner. She clearly talks about his eyes the way she saw them in the mirror of the bus; they were not blue, but brownish and beautiful she says. She was in a bus, accompanied by her protectionist family members, on her way to a boarding school to complete her high school, she was in the 8th grade, he was probably a couple of years older. She clearly remembers not being able to travel by bus alone during those days. She clearly remembers how old they were. She clearly remembers his eyes and beginning for the first time to perceive him like that. And yet when the filmmaker translates this narrative to film Moideen has blue eyes, Kanchana is a daredevil running off into a bus on her own, and they are both full grown adults in ‘control’ of their sexuality. Why did the filmmaker, and I will ask it like this, Aryan-ize his eyes? Why did he erase their childhood? What is it about the filmmaker’s moral location that prevents him from being able to consider two pre-teens who grew up together departing from narrow narratives of possession and vision, and exploring feelings through books with underlined words, with the younger girl being clearly unapologetic about this sexual-romantic exploration?

It is clear then that no part of Kanchana’s narrative is relevant to the filmmaker beyond the establishment of her as (a virginal upper-caste Hindu) ‘Moideen’s girl’ then ‘Moideen’s woman’ and finally as ‘Moideen’s widow’. But then one asks: who is Moideen? And the filmmaker still doesn’t have an answer. Except in one or two photos made available in the documentary and elsewhere in a sufficiently large fan world on the interweb, Moideen is seen sporting a beard. Throughout the movie, however, he has blue eyes, a peculiar wig, and no beard. Indeed, all markers of his Muslim identity are erased from his body. And since Prithviraj has done a poor job of staying true to the accent, even speech markers are easily forgotten. Interestingly, however, the filmmaker has taken every effort to portray Moideen’s father as per the islamophobic stereotype of what a regressive and violent Muslim looks like. Even though in the one photo of Moideen’s father that appears in the documentary he is not seen to be sporting a beard, nor is he a large man, the movie shows him with a long beard and a huge belly, travelling in a Benz car [it wouldn’t be wrong to say that his beard and Benz car have received more screen time than the letters they exchanged]. And the very first scene of the movie is Moideen’s father – looking like this – walking in with a bloody knife. Was this necessary? There is no need to deny that Moideen and his father had no love lost between them and that they were perhaps staunch political adversaries. Nor is there a need to deny that Moideen was attacked by his father in connection with this feud. But this attack and feud had very little to do with the Moideen-Kanchana love saga, so why bother portraying it at all, and that too so terribly and incorrectly? So then, according to the filmmaker, Moideen – portrayed in opposition to his vile, regressive, political opportunist Muslim father – is a progressive, non-Muslim looking, non-violent, modern man who happens to be Muslim and whose closest friend and comrade is not a Muslim (Mukkam Bhasi). Indeed, throughout the film if we look carefully we do not see Moideen interacting, exchanging meaningful dialogues with any Muslim character except his father. The film erases Moideen’s siblings and his Muslim context completely thereby failing to convey who Moideen really was as a person. What were the writings of Moideen, writings and thoughts that he is also said to have shared and developed with Kanchana, writings that existed outside of the letters, in the public domain? What did they say about his politics, his identity? Did he practice Islam? How? What did he do for those ten years they couldn’t see each other at all? Where did he keep travelling to? Who were the people he met outside Mukkam? What did it mean for him to be able to keep moving, keep writing, while Kanchana was in confinement?

The filmmaker has reduced the question of Kanchana’s identity to that of a sacrifice, and created Moideen’s identity out of his own imagination. And so that is what this movie is, just his imagination: patriarchal, casteist and up to no good. After playing around with the timelines of the story towards the end Moideen’s friend Mukkam Bhasi (who appears as a narrator out of nowhere in the middle of the movie) is shown closing a diary [dated 2015!] in which he has documented their love saga. Mukkam Bhasi is not known to have written any such book. The book that has been written about them is by P T Mohammed Sadiq [Moideen Kanchanamala: Orapoorva Pranayajeevitham, 2012]. This may immediately seem irrelevant to the story but by transmuting the role of the narrator onto a caste Hindu male the filmmaker has made sure that the caste Hindu character of the film is retained and upheld. Throughout the movie therefore we see only caste Hindu motifs and symbols. There is passing reference to a Christian missionary school and a church but even there the caste Hindu girl becomes the cleansing force speaking against inequality within the church. [Did that even happen, or was that the filmmaker’s overactive imagination?] The central character is a Muslim, but there is not even a mosque that appears in those multiple onerous shots of scenic Mukkam. And so, when the movie ends it ends at the point where Kanchana, dressed in a silk saree, all caste Hindu markers intact, steps into a dead Moideen’s house. Forgotten it is that she lives today without these markers, as a Muslim widow. Forgotten it is that she survived, built a life out of his memories and that life has been neither simple nor without struggles of their own. Forgotten is her life outside the caste Hindu fold, and yet not outside Mukkam. But once the immediately perceivable acts of bodily harm, violence and death cease to be a part of the story our filmmaker has lost interest and therefore the plot. So the story must end there. Perhaps it would have helped him if she had died too, but she lived and he doesn’t know what to do with that, except to glorify her enforced widowhood (the only possibility acceptable to his moral location).

The Labour, Letter and Body of Love…

But we need to get out of a cyclical critiquing of simply the so-called core of this tale i.e. the Moideen-Kanchana love saga. The idea that Kanchana and Moideen were somehow (by virtue of their divine love) beyond being implicated in the feudal and oppressive caste structures is fully naïve. In the documentary Kanchana continues to differentiate between orthodoxy of the past and communal feeling and blames the former[placing it as a thing of the past] for what happened. The filmmaker goes out of his way to prove that both Moideen and Kanchana were ‘uttamapurushar’ – caste-less, class-less, progressives – who had only the most benevolent feelings towards the poor, ‘lower’ caste and dalit persons. There are scenes where Kanchana is shown ‘gifting’ her broken gold earrings to the ‘lower’ caste ‘servant’ woman, where Moideen is shown to be waving at a Dalit couple (living outside Kanchana’s house in a dilapidated hut) who in their turn are made to wave back with an expression of gratitude (as though this ‘divine’ love is being enacted for their upliftment!) and then retreat into their hut. But this benevolence comes at a heavy price for the ‘beneficiaries’ – life-long unpaid labour as messengers of ‘divine’ love. In the documentary Kanchana clearly mentions sending and receiving letters through ‘servants’. And when we see it like that, this divine love story was predicated upon the material exploitation of ‘lower’ caste women and children made possible by the ‘upper’ caste-class feudal structures in operation. What were the perils they went through? Could they have – cast(e) as they are as unholy benefactors of the heroic couple and the extant caste-class structures – could they have refused service? The beating of the young boy who comes carrying a letter for Kanchana becomes a comedy scene; the fear of the woman carrying the letter to Kanchana becomes a forgettable visual in a song as she disappears from the scene as soon as Kanchana gets her letter. Unholy labour in the service of a ‘divine’ love. We need to ask this question then: how were the conversations of their love made possible? Did not the very same material structures that prevent them from living together also provide them with both the letter and labour to articulate and further their love?

Here one can draw comparisons, in a hierarchical manner, with Sancharram [written and directed by Lijy J Pullappally, 2004] a lesbian love story set in rural Kerala and Fandry [written and directed by Nagraj Manjule, 2013] the tale of a teenage Dalit boy, in rural Maharashtra, desperately wishing to express his love for an ‘upper’ caste girl. Sancharram is perhaps the first movie from an Indian context that actually refuses to – unlike the much touted Fire – speak of lesbian love as a result of a failure of heterosexual love and/or marriage or as a result of childhood trauma. This movie, even while capturing the isolation and desolation of rural Kerala without attempting to romanticize it, however, has also taken the caste Nair narrative as central and there are moments when the lead character Kiran, from a “warrior” Kurup family, is shown as the benevolent ‘equalist’. The reason I pick this [apart from it being the only queer centric movie from Kerala I know of] is because here too the letter is used as a tool by Kiran [a character shown as modern, progressive, studious, and poetic] to put down her love for Delilah [overtly feminine, sexual, distracted and weak]. But she pens this, having given up on the possibility of expressing herself, as a ghost writer for their common teenage male friend who has a crush on the ‘seductively’ beautiful Delilah. And so those letters that are meant to express queer love are written in a man’s voice to a woman, being forcibly drafted within the paradigm of compulsory heterosexuality, leaving little scope for an alternate expression.  And yet, these are letters that get written and get delivered because there is a huge ‘plot’ hole that allows this writing, and this delivery. That can never be the case with Jabya. Jabya from Fandry, prevented by caste hetero-patriarchy most violently directed at ‘the untouchable’, but overcome by long held feelings does write a moving letter of love to Shalu, a letter that can never reach her and therefore remains nothing more than a hidden soliloquy[3], something muttered under one’s breath.

Waiting for a life of Love…

One’s tale of love then is not simply a matter of letter [or being lettered]. Indeed if we return for a moment to the catastrophe that is Ennu Ninte Moideen we notice that despite the fact that Kanchana created a whole new system/language of communication she taught Moideen through the letters – delivered under peril to their person by the ‘servants’ – the only letters we get a glimpse of are the ones written by Moideen, and only those that are in the nature of instructions to her. I don’t mean to say that they should have published personal communication through the film but the question does arise: what allowed for dialogues where Moideen could claim Kanchana as his own and in the few and far dialogues Kanchana has she only asserts her will to wait? Are we even inclined to wonder what she expressed through those letters?

One’s tale of love – it is good to repeat – is not simply a matter of letters, or being lettered, but also of the bodily spaces that occupy and are occupied in the pursuit of such love. Human love is never divine; it is material, bodily, flawed and networked. In the case of Kanchana, a young woman who expresses her sexual and romantic desire [a desire that has now been drafted into the holy grail of widowhood] toward a progressive Muslim man, confinement and abuse becomes a matter of course. But this is not just a matter of course for the 60s. In Sancharram too, as a matter of course Delilah was put under house arrest. To this day there are such confinements and abuses taking place all over that little, horrific and self-obsessed State.  And this movie too, condenses 22 long years of confinement into a matter of course; confinement that has serious implications for a person’s mental health. And again he forgets to ask that question: how did she live? When the caste Hindu family was convinced that they no longer need to ‘protect’ their honour, i.e her body from Moideen, who nursed her back and into what? There is no clear answer to the who – except we are told [in the documentary] that another man who had loved her had spoken to Moideen’s mother to take her home – because there is no documentation of how she lived through 13 attempts at suicide, who fed her, who spoke to her, whose labour was employed in caring for her? Today she is a widow who lives alone with a heart problem, who runs a charitable organization from a small dilapidated building with hardly any funds. When put this way, I see nothing inspirational or aspirational in this love story. But what is to be underscored here is that there was a possibility, a network of people for her to stay alive. How did that possibility, however lean, arise? Did it have something to do with ‘virginal’, ‘chaste’, ‘widow’ and ‘untouched’ being inscribed on her body? Can those inscriptions be wiped away? Delilah and Kiran, in Sancharram, become dirty [in a way Kanchana will never be] and except a gentle touch that Delilah receives from her grandmother, they are both immediately cast in shame. Jabya’s wounds, as his body, his words, remain without salve, without touch – untouchable.

The filmmaker in Ennu Ninte Moideen, has – as in the case of most legends of love – inseparably intertwined violence with love while at the same time imagining them as polar opposites. So he can’t tell the tale without aggrandizing and even creating his own moments of violence that can even remotely connected to the two central characters – the overt scenes of beating, torture, and the stabbing – while claiming that their love exists purely to annihilate this violence. Following on every legend of love, the discourse seems something like this: love and violence are caught in a war such that when the one ends/wins the other ceases to exist as well. Neither love nor violence is seen to have origins – they are just pre-existing, self-reproducing cyclical thoughts. Indeed there is nothing revolutionary about love if it isn’t to resist violence and be annihilated by it. It is a war of wits it seems, removed from material concerns. The idea that yes, love exists in many ways as a route of escape from and rejection of [not opposition to] circumstances of active and passive violence, isolation and aggression is understood, but how do we represent love that can have and has slightly deeper inclinations and articulations than just that? I go back to the letters because they are the kernel of this story. In this movie the chunk of letters they write are shown to be a heroic act in defiance of confinement, but is there a way to understand and represent these letters as an act of reaffirming the possibility of life, an act of building an alternate life when in confinement? The difference may appear subtle and nonsensical even but the reason I argue for this [albeit shoddy] restatement, or any other better articulation that can be had, is this: love and violence are not caught in a legendary war. To say that is to say that the two persuasions are somehow oppositional, not constitutive and therefore also are on an equal footing. To say that is to wipe away the pain and suffering in waiting for someone, something, a decision, a resolution, justice, anything, a bit of life. And that’s the catch there, because if we wipe away that waiting in its fullness, length and pain, we wipe away the complex narratives of violence that speaks from the locations of vulnerability and precariousness occupied by those who are made to wait for different lengths of time and in different ways. Further, we wipe away the different articulations and desires of love that seek and imagine departures from this waiting.

In Sancharram, Delilah was waiting to leave the empty village and explore the world and in that waiting she accepts the exciting possibility of falling in love with Kiran and discovering their relationship and her sexuality anew. Kiran on the other hand is waiting for the moment when she can assert and be accepted for her lesbian identity and her (queer) love for Delilah as she writes: ‘I know not what love is, perhaps I will find it tomorrow or another day…until that day I would prefer to worship you from the valleys of anonymity…I see a love awaiting me like a ripe thundercloud caught in the far horizon of my life’s journey. Like a cold, dark night, love must one day wed our skies. You and I, like fireflies, will soar into that darkening sky…may your wings be borne by strength.’[4]

In Fandry, Jabya awaits an end to continuous humiliation and embarrassment, he longs for what are ‘simple pleasures’ for the upper caste, such as a pair of jeans, he refuses to respond to calls of ‘being black’, and waits for a space to be born where he can express his love for Shalu, a love that is tied intrinsically to all this waiting and longing. So in the tiny space of a white paper he writes: ‘Shalu, I don’t have the words to express how much I like you. I know I am poor and not of your caste. But honestly no one could love you as much as I do. Not even your mother. I’m ready to do everything it takes to win your love. If you asked I would lay down my life for you. I care for nothing in this world but you. I think of you all day and night. Trust me this one time. Shalu, if you don’t like me tear this letter and throw it away. I will understand. But please don’t tell your parents about it. Don’t show it to anyone and embarrass me. And if you love me too please write to me or when you come to school tomorrow braid your hair in two plaits. I will understand that you love me too. I eagerly await your reply. Only yours, Jambawant’[5]

Both these letters underline the key structural vulnerabilities of their writers. They both are looking for words that capture the meanings of their love. If Kiran must navigate a world devoid of affirmative lesbian representations, a world isolated, where word spreads like wild fire, a world where love as she understands it doesn’t exist, she must do it while protecting her anonymity and speaking through a heterosexual man’s voice. If the world turns even for a day so that Jabya can share his letter with Shalu, all he wants is that she not tell on him and put his life in danger, or humiliate him.

The idea is not to romanticize waiting; far from it. The idea is to think about how removed from the ‘materiality of waiting’ our understanding of love in relationships is. And therefore an inability to apprehend the hierarchies and (im)possibilities in this waiting; and an inability to recognize that ‘the’ violence that we pit our romanticized versions of waiting against do indeed thrive on this waiting, this draining. Because this waiting is not a moment of heroism, this waiting is an effort to re-imagine structures, this waiting is largely a solitary exercise. Kanchana becomes a shadow, a widow; Delilah gives in to marital pressures; Kiran contemplates death; Jabya, suffocated, hides the letter and picks the stone.

And here I return to a song used in the movie written by Rafeeq Ahamed, the one moment, I found, that sincerely struggles with her apparently motionless wait. The song, titled Kathirunnu Kathirunnu [I have sat and waited], attempts to portray what the waiting has done to her, and I offer a poor translation here:

The river has thinned/The ghat has been deserted/And time too has passed me by/Like petals falling off in summer/The bangles have slipped off my wrists…
I have sat and waited/I have sat and waited…
My wings have been broken as easily as shadows/Like a flame caught in the wind, I’ve been burnt/Like a thread, I’ve been spread thin/As I sit, wait, reminisce/I’ve forgotten what it is to laugh…
Eaten alive by your memories/Through each moment, each endless night/I wait for the disappearing clouds – like your silence/To stop and rain down on me, for me…
Seasons change, shedding days/The rains have gone, the sun is here/And the image of you keeps slipping out of my eyes…
I have sat and waited, forever/To catch a glimpse of you…
You who have moved to the rhythm of the waves/All I’ve yearned is your companionship/Tell me, will the flowers we’ve hidden/ in the moist garden of jasmines/will they blossom only for us?
I am a wick that is charring/A wave that is aimlessly searching the vast seas/And everyday, everywhere/Through tired, half-closing eyes/All I see is…
I have sat and waited/I have sat and waited. 

This song slowly paddles away from the legend creating stream of the filmmaker’s consciousness. It becomes important for at least two reasons: for one, it undoes the convenient position that one can empathize only with that which one has experienced or which speaks to one’s own location; second, it speaks of the bodily pain as well as desire tied into this static, endless wait. Here, the lyricist captures the weakening of her body – ‘thinning’, ‘charring’, ‘forgetting’ [laughter, his image], as well as the desire that is now waning – ‘flowers hidden away, awaiting a blossoming’ – as she realizes that she is tied down here and he keeps moving ‘to the rhythm of the waves’.     

There is a near universal dejection and depression to waiting. And Kerala seems to be that corner where we go to wait for there is nothing else to be done in that caste ridden Hindu hetero-patriarchal society. I return to the quote at the head of this piece. This man may be waiting for a small bit of land that is caught in a property battle between his married brothers, waiting for a better job, and here he prepares for a long wait for a partner who may soon move away and even get married. He is not preparing to be a part of a divine legend or a war. He is preparing (and being prevented) to build a life here, in this world. And that is not a matter of Shakespearean legend making, but a matter of structural injustice.

—–

[1] I am eternally grateful to good friends AR, NK and YK for having discussions that have led to most of the thoughts in this section.

[2] And if one compares it to a more conversational, but not without attempts at dramatization, interview with television channel Media One, one would also see what would be blithely called ‘inconsistencies’ in her own narratives, which in my reading is not more than temporal gaps in repeating what is a long winding experience of trauma and confinement at the hands of a caste-patriarchal establishment.

[3] For a lengthy and useful engagement with the movie Fandry do see – https://acrazymindseye.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/fandry-where-love-letter-becomes-a-soliloquy/

[4] Reproduced from the English subtitles provided in the film.

[5] Reproduced from https://acrazymindseye.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/fandry-where-love-letter-becomes-a-soliloquy/

India: Hang Your Bigotry To Dry

Rest in Peace Yakub.
Rest in Peace Yakub.
Rest in Peace Yakub.

I don’t chant this like the garbled verses,
hymns may be,
that boom from the seat of your pants
as ferociously as they do
from the tip of your tongue;
that you’ve learned to find peace in;
hymns may be,
that you force everyone to find peace in.
Because you’re secular that way,
And only just that way.

I chant them below my breath.
I chant them to ease the terror in my friend.
In me.
I chant them…
Well,
Because I have to.

You, the State of India,
You –
In your bid to create a nation,
breathless, neck broken
writhing in the noose of vengeance
You –
You leave me no choice.

Rest in Peace Yakub.

There is no poetry in pain.
There is just an angry, seething question.
[If the irony pleases you, know this:
the nation doesn’t want to know.
It doesn’t.]
Just a seething question,
lying twisted, tired,
beaten, harassed, penniless
hungry
at the margins of the white paper
that has killed a human today.
Again.

Ill-worded, stuttered,
tired, torn: Here’s that question…

Would you, dear State of India
Would you please…
As the reverberations of a body
Writhing at the end of a noose
Cease to end
[And more pile up to pay
for the collective wrath of the State…]

Would you please…
Hang your bigotry to dry
Like you hang your velveteen robes
Outside your palaces?
So the world can see.
Would you please…
Hang your bigotry to dry
Like you hang human lives
Stealthily at the break of dawn?
So the world can see.
Would you please…
Hang your bigotry to dry
Today?
It’s wet with blood.

Would you please…
Just
Hang your bloodthirsty bigotry to dry
Today?

It could save lives.
Or,
Did that not occur to you?

Rest in Peace Yakub.

Why The Asexual Dating App is Not My Thing

Many of my friends on facebook, including some who identify as being on the asexual spectrum, shared this idea floating around the interweb: a dating app for asexual persons.

I don’t have money to fund the app. Zero, zilch, nada. Jobless person face, do I humbly make.

But even if I had the money I’d like to reconsider the reasoning behind this app, before going ahead with it. Let’s be clear, I’m not rejecting it. Perhaps the personal experiences of the person seeking funding might be playing a huge part in hir/her/his desire to create this app. But we know enough to not follow only route A – experience knows all – or route B – technology saves us all, or route C – some ill-gotten permutation or combination of route A and B.

First let’s look at the reasons given:

a) Tinder, Grindr – overly sexual (and latter is only for gay men), people there only for casual sex
b) Don’t want unsolicited “explicit” pictures (equating sexual harassment with sexual interactions)
c) a lot of people want only relationship, no sex

ergo, “this app will allow those people to group together and date among people who want the same things they do.”

Which may be a nice thing overall, but is it really? First of all it encourages a certain, dangerous ghetto formation within the larger queer spectrum [where there are enough caste, class and race ghettos already] without giving people a chance to ‘mix it up’. It is also a comfortable place for the overtly, and annoyingly and forever hypersexual people to say, ‘ohkie then, you’ve got your little app now go play with it and don’t come disturb my hypersexual paradise.’ For me, politically, that is a loophole priviledged sexual persons are going to use to not even consider diversifying conversations and relationship/dating choices. It also negates the wonderfully real possibilities of relationships between sexual and asexual persons by starting at the point that they are wholly impossible. Secondly, the assumption is also that only sexual people sexually harass other people, thereby equating sexual harassment to being sexual [!!]. This is yet another dangerous argument to make. The visibility that asexuality needs cannot be at the cost of regressing in our understanding of sexual harassment and rape culture. We’ve spent centuries telling people that sexual harassment and rape are about power, objectification and aggression against specific marginalised identity groups and have nothing to do with sex or sexual attraction. So, one can’t claim that asexual persons are above participating in the rape culture. In fact just a few weeks back a highly misogynist, and violent post [a man preparing to insert a nail into a woman’s behind] was circulating on a page dedicated to ‘asexual humour’, with adequate likes and shares, might i add. In fact there are quite a few asexual visibility fora that are crowded with white, heterosexist, annoyingly sheldon-esque characters who slut shame people by way of humour and think it is ok because they are asexual. Thirdly, ‘some people want only relationship, no sex’; those people could be sexual people as well, and they may want this for a very short time, or those people could be asexual who are able/willing to have sex for short periods of time; or something else.  There are so many possibilities.

(Image courtesy: Asexual Aces)

While I can see why being in a hyper-sexual world can make dating and finding fulfilling relationships difficult, I am going to be averse to this kind of ghetto-isation in the name of building safe spaces. In a single stroke it demonizes sexual people, homogenises all asexual people and wholly rejects the possibilities of dialogues and new relationship paradigms that can emerge when persons on the [a]sexuality spectrum ditch assumptions and get talking. Perhaps for me, a certain liberation is when I can label myself asexual and stay in regular dating spaces where there are all kinds of peopleand still be counted, still be spoken to, still approach and be approached by people. These “special” spaces can also unintentionally nip in the bud all efforts toward making existing dating spaces safe and accessible for all people who wish to be there, because it speaks from a philosophical position of ‘to each his own’ and we know enough to understand that that just fucks up the world, breaks it up further and makes it more lonesome than it already is.

Imagine what would happen to the asexual who gets rejected from the asexual dating app for a 100 reasons we won’t speak about, where will ze go?